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I. INTRODUCTION 
 When the colonies attained their political independence from Europe, they also 
acquired a problematic relationship with the indigenous peoples who already inhabited 
the “new” continent.  Due to Britain’s practice of seeking tribal consent to settle lands, 
underlying questions about the tribes’ and tribal members’ rights vis-à-vis settlers lay 
dormant during the period of Britain’s rule.1 Since the United States’ formation, however, 
tribal and Anglo-American interests often have conflicted.  As a result, the Supreme 
Court repeatedly has adjudicated the tribes’ and the United States’ respective rights as 
sovereigns. 
 The Court’s jurisprudence in deciding these disputes is best understood as two 
separate periods: 1823-1977, and 1978 to present.  In both, the Court developed doctrines 
to vindicate the United States’ interests at the expense of tribal sovereignty, but there are 
important distinctions between them.  During the first period, the doctrines the Court 
developed constrained sovereignty when its exercise expressly conflicted with the 
interests of the United States.  In the second period, the Court extended its inquiry and 
began to divest tribes of sovereignty when it considered that sovereignty implicitly 
incongruent with the United States’ interests – even when allowing tribal sovereignty 
would not create an express conflict between the two sovereigns. 
 This Article explores the limits that the Court historically has imposed upon tribal 
sovereignty and the questions raised by the Court’s most recent doctrine: the doctrine of 
implicit divestiture.  Section II reviews the two doctrines the Court developed during the 
first period of its Indian law jurisprudence: the doctrine of discovery and the doctrine of 
plenary power.  Section III introduces the second period’s doctrine of implicit divestiture, 
 
1 See DAVID H. GETCHES ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 55 (5th ed. 2005). 
2and discusses a potential limit on that doctrine: the “congressional delegation exception,” 
the use of which the Court recently held removed a constraint on tribal jurisdiction that 
the Court had imposed under the implicit divestiture doctrine.  Part IV reviews 
commentators’ thoughts about how the exception might be used to fortify tribal 
sovereignty, and considers potential problems in applying the exception.  It argues that, at 
present, the implicit divestiture doctrine lacks a coherent rationale; that this makes the 
doctrine unmoored and malleable; and that its malleability potentially poses enormous 
threats to exercises of tribal sovereignty – even those expressly sanctioned by Congress. 
II. 1823-1977: THE DOCTRINES OF DISCOVERY AND PLENARY POWER 
 The Supreme Court considered the nature of tribal authority beginning in the 
nineteenth century, as interactions between non-Indians and tribes generated litigation.  
To resolve these disputes, the Court developed two doctrines: the doctrine of discovery 
and the doctrine of plenary power.  The effect of these doctrines was to vindicate the 
United States’ interests at the expense of tribal sovereignty. 
A. Johnson v. M’Intosh: The Doctrine of Discovery and the United States as 
Successor in Interest 
 In Johnson v. M’Intosh,2 the Court considered the effect of Europe’s discovery of 
the New World upon tribal sovereignty.  The case involved competing claims to land 
originally inhabited by the Illinois and Piankeshaw Indians which had been under 
Britain’s control.  Prior to the American Revolution, the Tribes’ chiefs sold the lands to 
various individuals.3 Virginia assumed control of the territory during the Revolution and 
later ceded its rights to the United States; the United States, in turn, eventually sold the 
 
2 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543 (1823). 
3 Id. at 550-54 (Illinois Indians), 555-58 (Piankeshaw Indians). 
3tracts to McIntosh.4 After McIntosh took possession of the land, the parties that had 
purchased it from the Tribes sued McIntosh, arguing they had superior title. 5 
After reviewing the history of North America’s colonization, the Court concluded 
that European nations’ “discovery” of the continent necessarily divested Indian nations of 
complete sovereignty.  The Court based its holding on the “doctrine of discovery” 
developed by colonizing European governments.6 This doctrine, the Court explained, 
grew out of a mutual need:  
 [I]t was necessary [for the European nations who colonized North 
America], in order to avoid conflicting settlements, and consequent war 
with each other, to establish a principle, which all should acknowledge as 
the law by which the right of acquisition, which they all asserted, should 
be regulated as between themselves.7
Thus, as the various European nations rushed to stake claims on the “new” continent, it 
became to each’s advantage to establish rules by which its claims would be respected by 
the others.  These interests converged to establish the doctrine of discovery by which 
each European nation vindicated its claims in exchange for recognizing the claims of its 
competitors. 
 According to the Court, the doctrine’s “original fundamental principle” was that 
discovery gave the discoverer the sole right to title over the discovered land.8 This title, 
the Court found, was “consummated” by possessing the land.9 Until possession, 
 
4 Id. at 558-60.  
5 Plaintiffs also included successors in interest to the parties that had purchased the lands. 
6 For a comprehensive discussion of the doctrine of discovery, see generally ROBERT J. MILLER, NATIVE 
AMERICA, DISCOVERED AND CONQUERED: THOMAS JEFFERSON, LEWIS & CLARK, AND MANIFEST DESTINY 
(2006). 
7 Johnson, 21 U.S. at 573. 
8 Id. at 574 (“original fundamental principle”), 573. 
9 Id. at 573. 
4discovery prevented other European governments from establishing any claim to the land, 
including claims based on negotiations with the tribes that occupied it.10 
The Court next considered the effect of the doctrine upon the rights of North 
America’s indigenous inhabitants: 
The exclusion of all other Europeans, necessarily gave to the nation 
making the discovery the sole right of acquiring the soil from the natives, 
and establishing settlements upon it.  It was a right with which no 
Europeans could interfere.  It was a right which all asserted for themselves, 
and to the assertion of which, by others, all assented. 
 Those relations which were to exist between the discoverer and the 
natives, were to be regulated by themselves.  The rights thus acquired 
being exclusive, no other power could interpose between them. 
 In the establishment of these relations, the rights of the original 
inhabitants were . . . necessarily, to a considerable extent, impaired.  They 
were admitted to be the rightful occupants of the soil, with a legal as well 
as a just claim to retain possession of it . . . but their rights to complete 
sovereignty, as independent nations, were necessarily diminished, and 
their power to dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they 
pleased, was denied by the original fundamental principle, that discovery 
gave exclusive title to those who made it.11 
Here, the Court held the event of discovery divested tribes of the sovereign power to 
convey their lands freely.  Although tribes might (and often did) remain in possession of 
the land, the doctrine of discovery granted the discoverer the right to obtain land from a 
tribe.12 In addition, it granted the discoverer power, with the tribes, to “regulate” the 
relations which were to exist between them.  These rights and powers were exclusive: no 
one but that land’s discoverer held them. 
 Finally, the Court concluded that Britain’s treaty with the United States at the 
close of the American Revolution, in which Britain ceded its territorial rights, conveyed 
 
10 See id. 
11 Id. at 573-74. 
12 Indeed, the Court went on to say that the doctrine gave the discoverer not only the exclusive right to 
acquire land occupied by Indians, but also the power to grant title to others while the tribes were in 
possession of the land. Id. at 574. 
5the rights and powers of discovery upon the American States.13 The States subsequently 
ceded their rights to the United States.14 Thus, the rights and powers of discovery 
eventually vested in the federal government. 
 As applied to McIntosh, the finding that discovery divested tribes of the power to 
convey their land to anyone except their discoverer meant that the Tribes lacked the 
ability to sell legal title to the plaintiffs, and that McIntosh’s title was superior.  More 
broadly speaking, Johnson stands for the principle that discovery divested tribes of their 
authority as sovereigns to have government-to-government relations with anyone but 
their discoverer (or its successor in interest).  External government-to-government 
relations with another European country, the Court said, “would have been considered 
and treated as an invasion of the [discoverer’s] territories.”15 
The constraints upon tribal sovereignty imposed by discovery did not mean that 
tribes no longer functioned as governments.  Interestingly, the Court in Johnson 
recognized that tribes had authority to govern the sale of the rights they retained: 
If an individual might . . . purchase [Indian title], still he could acquire . . . 
that title.  Admitting [the tribes’] power to change their laws or usages, so 
far as to allow an individual to separate a portion of their lands from the 
common stock, and hold it in severalty, still it is a part of their territory, 
and is held under them, by a title dependent on their laws.  The grant 
derives its efficacy from [that tribe’s] will; and, if [that tribe] choose[s] to 
resume it, and make a different disposition of the land, the Courts of the 
United States cannot interpose for the protection of the title. . . . The 
person who purchases lands from the Indians, within their territory, 
incorporates himself with them, so far as respects the property purchased; 
holds their title under their protection, and subject to their laws.16 
13 See id. at 584. 
14 Id. at 586. 
15 Id. at 584. 
16 Id. at 592-93. 
6Here, the Court’s comments indicate that those powers retained by tribes after discovery 
remain subject to tribal authority.  Post-discovery, tribes retained the right of occupancy 
and were able to convey it to another party, even a non-Indian; these conveyed rights, 
however, depended upon that tribe (rather than the United States) for recognition and 
enforcement.17 Thus, the Johnson plaintiffs’ remedies, if available, were only available 
under tribal law. 
B. Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock: the Advent of Congressional Plenary Power 
 In one of the most sweeping decisions in its history, Lone Wolf v. Hitchcock,18 the 
Court addressed the question of the bounds of tribal authority vis-à-vis the United States.  
Lone Wolf and its premise – that Congress had “plenary” power over Indian tribes – 
became the basis and justification for subsequent limitations upon tribal authority over 
reservation lands. 
 Lone Wolf contested Congress’ authority to unilaterally change agreements made 
by tribes and officers of the federal government.  The Kiowa and Comanche Tribes’ 1867 
treaty with the United States provided specifically that cessions of reservation lands 
required the consent of three-fourths of the adult male Indians on the reservation.19 In 
1892, the Tribes signed an agreement to cede lands held in common by them to the 
United States; the United States was to allot lands to individual tribal members and 
 
17 In the instant case, the Court determined that, since the plaintiffs’ beneficial title depended on the Tribes’ 
recognition, Johnson et. al lost the right of occupancy they had purchased from the Tribes when the Tribes 
ceded their lands to the United States without recognizing plaintiffs’ titles within the terms of the cession: 
“[The Tribes’] cession of the country, without a reservation of this land, affords a fair presumption, that 
they considered [the conveyance to plaintiffs] as of no validity.  They ceded to the United States this very 
property, after having used it in common with other lands, as their own, from the date of their deeds to the 
time of cession[.]” Id. at 594. 
18 187 U.S. 553 (1903). 
19 Id. at 554. 
7purchase “surplus” lands for later sale to non-Indians.20 Subsequently, Congress acted to 
effectuate the agreement by congressional acts.  These acts, however, modified the 
agreement in various particulars.21 
The Tribes sued, arguing that the act violated their property rights without due 
process and was unconstitutional.22 The Tribes had three arguments against the law, two 
of which touched upon the federal government’s authority to unilaterally take action 
affecting the Tribes.  First, the Tribes argued that the agreement they had signed (and the 
act implementing it) was invalid because it had not been consented to by three-fourths of 
the Tribes’ adult male population, as required by treaty.23 Second, the Tribes argued the 
act was invalid because it unilaterally changed the terms of the signed agreement 
“without submitting such changes to the Indians for their consideration.”24 
In a short opinion, the Court affirmed lower court decisions that sustained the 
United States’ motion to dismiss.25 The Court explained that Congress had complete 
power over tribes: 
Indians who . . . [are not] fully emancipated from the control and 
protection of the United States are subject, at least so far as the tribal 
lands . . . [are] concerned, to be controlled by direct legislation of 
Congress  . . . Plenary authority over the tribal relations of the Indians has 
 
20 Id. at 554-55. 
21 As finally passed, the adopted bill: changed the time frame for making allotments; amended requirements 
regarding the composition of Indian allotments (between agricultural and grazing land); set aside an 
amount of grazing land to be used in common by the Tribes; eliminated provisions which treated the Indian 
agent and army officer who negotiated the agreement for the U.S. as members of the Tribes (thus entitling 
them to benefits under the agreement); exempted monies from the surplus land sale from Indian 
depredation claims; and provided that surplus land proceeds would be subject to further congressional 
action in the event that a claim then pending against the Tribes (by other tribes) was successful. See id. at 
556-60. 
22 Id. at 561. 
23 Id. at 554-55.  This contention was confirmed by the Secretary of the Interior.  The Secretary lacked 
census records for the year the agreement was made, and so based his calculation upon member rolls used 
to make payments to tribal members. Id. at 557. 
24 Id. at 561.  The Tribes also argued that the agreement was invalid because the interpreters had 
misrepresented its terms to the Tribes. Id. 
25 Id. at 568. 
8been exercised by Congress from the beginning, and the power has always 
been deemed a political one, not subject to be controlled by the judicial 
department of the government. . . . [A]s with treaties made with foreign 
nations[,] . . . the legislative power might pass laws in conflict with 
treaties made with the Indians.26 
In Johnson, the Court found that discovery granted the discoverer the exclusive right to 
“regulate” its relationship to the tribes within its territory.27 Lone Wolf further elucidates 
the United States/tribal relationship, characterizing it as one in which Congress has 
absolute, unilateral power over tribes. 
 By characterizing Congress’ power as plenary, the Court found that, while the 
United States’ relationship with tribes developed through mutual negotiation, these 
negotiations merely were an exercise of Congress’ absolute power over tribes.  
Essentially, the Court’s rationale is that the greater power (plenary power) includes the 
lesser (the power to negotiate).  Thus, under Lone Wolf, the United States would have 
been within its rights had it chosen never to negotiate with the tribes but unilaterally to 
impose its will upon them from the start. 
C. Analysis of Early Doctrines Regarding Tribal Sovereignty 
 The doctrines of discovery and plenary power can be criticized easily on the 
grounds that they legitimize colonialism at the expense of indigenous rights.  In both 
Johnson and Lone Wolf, the Court sidesteps the inherent inequities caused by the United 
States’ actions and avoids discussion of the self-interest that motivates them.  Though the 
Court’s opinion in Johnson contains expressions of regret,28 these comments are 
unpersuasive in the face of the Court’s unerring affirmation of the United States’ absolute 
 
26 Id. at 567. 
27 Johnson v. M’Intosh, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 543, 573 (1823). 
28 Id. at 588 (“Conquest gives a title which the Courts of the conqueror cannot deny, whatever the private 
and speculative opinions of individuals may be, respecting the original justice of the claim which has been 
successfully asserted.”). 
9power over the tribes.  The Lone Wolf Court’s assertion that it “must presume that 
Congress acted in perfect good faith” in exercising its plenary power,29 and its suggestion 
that the Tribes instead petition Congress for relief,30 are of little comfort given its 
conclusion that any congressional act regarding Indians is nonjudiciable.  Moreover, 
Lone Wolf’s conclusion that the United States held more power than it exercised also 
figures as an unwelcome harbinger of – and invitation for – later impositions upon the 
tribes. 
 Nonetheless, unjust though they may be, these early doctrines at least have the 
virtue of restraint.  The consequences of discovery appear to be limited to the loss of 
legal title and the right to have a government-to-government relationship with any nation 
other than the United States; limitations on tribal sovereignty under the plenary power 
doctrine require express congressional action adverse to tribal sovereignty.  Ultimately, 
many tribes weathered discovery and various congressional acts (some intended to 
destroy them) and survived as political entities.31 
By contrast, the future of tribal sovereignty during the second, current period of 
jurisprudence is far from certain.  In this period, the Court created and continues to 
develop the doctrine of implicit divestiture.  Under this doctrine, the Court invalidates 
exercises of tribal sovereignty that it finds to be “inconsistent” with the tribes’ 
“dependent status.”  Unlike the doctrine of plenary power, implicit divestiture does not 
require express congressional action inimical to tribal sovereignty.  Under implicit 
 
29 Lone Wolf, 187 U.S. at 568. 
30 Id.
31 For an excellent overview of the history of congressional Indian policy, see generally DAVID H. GETCHES 
ET AL., CASES AND MATERIALS ON FEDERAL INDIAN LAW 140-256 (5th ed. 2005). The United States has 
pursued various measures to destroy tribalism. Id. Generally, early approaches attempted to achieve this 
goal by making traditional tribal lifestyles impossible; the Anglo-American lifestyle, meanwhile, was 
promoted aggressively. Id. at 141-47, 165-84.  From 1945-1961, the United States even attempted to 
assimilate tribal members by “terminating” tribes – ending their legal existences. Id. at 199-207.  
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divestiture, the Court scrutinizes the contested tribal act, and then itself decides whether 
the act was “inconsistent” with the tribe’s status.  If the Court finds the tribe’s act to be 
“inconsistent,” it holds the act invalid. 
Thus, through its implicit divestiture doctrine, the Court has interjected itself 
alongside Congress as a power able to curtail tribal sovereignty.  Invalidations under 
implicit divestiture do not merely enforce limits expressly imposed upon the tribes by 
Congress; rather, the Court creates limits independently based upon its determination of 
the act’s “consistency” with the tribes’ status.  The standard for the doctrine’s application 
is vague, with the result that it is difficult to determine the doctrine’s reach.  Moreover, 
judicially-imposed constraints may prove intractable: at present, it is unclear whether 
Congress can use its plenary power to check all constraints on tribal sovereignty imposed 
under the doctrine. 
III. 1978 – PRESENT: THE RISE OF JUDICIAL CONSTRAINTS ON TRIBAL 
SOVEREIGNTY 
A. Oliphant and Its Progeny: Implied Divestiture of Tribal Sovereignty  
 Beginning in 1978 with Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,32 the Supreme Court 
decided a series of cases which dramatically curtailed the sovereignty tribes retained 
under previous jurisprudence.  Specifically, the Court in Oliphant created a new doctrine 
by which to evaluate the validity of assertions of tribal authority: the doctrine of implicit 
divestiture. 
 At issue in Oliphant was whether a tribe retained inherent, sovereign power to 
assert criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians for their acts on the tribe’s reservation.  
Petitioners Mark David Oliphant and Daniel B. Belgarde were non-Indian residents of the 
 
32 435 U.S. 191 (1978). 
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Suquamish Indian Tribe’s Port Madison Reservation.33 The Tribe had adopted a Law and 
Order Code addressing a variety of offenses that purported to extend the Tribe’s 
jurisdiction over both Indians and non-Indians.34 Oliphant and Belgarde each were 
charged by the Tribe under the Code, and, in habeas corpus petitions to the United States 
District Court, each argued that the Tribe’s purported criminal jurisdiction was invalid as 
applied to non-Indians.35 The Tribe argued that it had criminal jurisdiction over non-
Indians as a result of its “retained inherent powers of government over the Port Madison 
Indian Reservation.”36 
In assessing the Tribe’s claim of retained authority, the Court boldly pronounced 
that tribes’ sovereign powers could be reduced even when the federal government had not 
acted expressly to delimit them: “[T]he tribes’ retained powers are not such that they are 
limited only by specific restrictions in treaties or congressional enactments.”37 Instead, 
the Court announced a new rule for determining when a tribe had been divested of 
sovereign power which applied even absent express federal action limiting tribal 
authority: “Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those powers of autonomous 
states that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers ‘inconsistent with their 
status.’”38 This holding is the central pillar of the doctrine of implicit divestiture.  The 
doctrine is one of divestiture because, through its application, Indian tribes are held to 
have been divested of specific sovereign powers; it is implicit because the divestiture is 
 
33 Id. at 194. 
34 Id. at 193.  The Tribe also had gone to great lengths to publicize its jurisdiction over all entrants to the 
Reservation: “[n]otices were placed in prominent places at the entrance to the Port Madison Reservation 
informing the public that entry onto the Reservation would be deemed implied consent to the criminal 
jurisdiction of the Suquamish tribal court.” Id. at 193 n.2. 
35 Id. at 194-95. 
36 Id. at 195-96. 
37 Id. at 208. 
38 Id. (citing Oliphant v. Schlie, 544 F.2d 1007 (9th Cir. 1976)) (emphasis in original). 
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not the result of an express executive or legislative action. Under the doctrine, tribal 
exercises of authority found to be inconsistent with the tribes’ status are null and void; 
the doctrine of implicit divestiture thus has become a powerful vehicle for challenging 
tribal actions. 
 In applying this new doctrine, the Oliphant Court ultimately determined that a 
tribe’s asserting criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians was inconsistent with its status 
and thus void.39 To reach this decision, the Court considered both the history of tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians and the federal government’s interest in protecting 
United States citizens from tribal prosecution.  After reviewing the history of tribal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court concluded that Congress, the Executive Branch, 
and lower federal courts each held a “commonly shared presumption” that tribes lacked 
criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians.40 In addition, the Court was concerned that 
allowing tribal jurisdiction would infringe upon important rights incident to United States 
citizenship.  The Court noted that “from the formation of the Union and the adoption of 
the Bill of Rights, the United States has manifested [a] . . . solicitude that its citizens be 
 
39 Id. at 210. 
40 Id. at 206.  The Court’s historical review acknowledged that the United States Reports did not 
specifically discuss the question of tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, but concluded that this omission 
was because historically the issue was moot: most tribes did not have a formal court system, and so did not 
assert jurisdiction over non-Indians.  Id. at 197.  The Court then reviewed treaties between the United 
States and various tribes, and decided that the treaties showed that both the federal government and the 
tribes presumed that tribes would lack jurisdiction over non-Indians absent a “congressional statute or 
treaty provision to that effect.” Id.; treaty provisions reviewed id. The Court also considered opinions by 
the Attorneys General, written in the 1800’s, that argued tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians was 
inconsistent with treaty provisions that recognized the United States’ sovereignty over Indian Country and 
the Indians’ dependence upon the United States. Id. at 199.  The Court noted that one federal court decision 
considering the issue had concluded that tribal courts lacked jurisdiction to try non-Indians.  The Court also 
reviewed legislative history regarding the issues of tribal criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians in a 
proposed Indian Territory, federal criminal jurisdiction over Indians, and federal legislation preventing 
trespass on Indian lands, and concluded that Congress’ discussions and acts evinced its understanding that 
tribes did not retain jurisdiction over non-Indians. Id. at 201-03, 204-05.  Finally, the Court noted that one 
of its 1891 opinions recognized that congressional acts “demonstrated an intent to reserve jurisdiction over 
non-Indians for the federal courts.” Id. at 204. 
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protected by the United States from unwarranted intrusions on their personal liberty.”41 It 
reviewed a prior case in which it had held the United States lacked federal criminal 
jurisdiction over tribal members on the basis that allowing federal jurisdiction would 
subject tribal members to trial under an “external and unknown code  . . . by a standard 
made for others and not for them . . . according to the law of a social state of which they 
have an imperfect conception.”42 Allowing tribal jurisdiction over non-Indians, the Court 
continued, would cause the same problem in reverse: United States citizens would be 
subjected to a similarly “external code.”  The federal interests in protecting United States 
citizens from unwarranted intrusions upon their personal liberty and from exposure to 
alien tribal court systems, said the Court, also led it to conclude that tribes lacked 
inherent jurisdiction to try non-Indians.43 
Subsequent decisions have built upon Oliphant and developed further guidelines 
for assessing whether the Court will find that a tribe’s authority was “inconsistent with 
[its] status” and therefore implicitly divested.  Generally, the Court has found the tribes to 
be divested of jurisdiction over anyone except their respective members.44 This principle 
applies to both criminal and civil jurisdiction.45 
The Court has carved out narrow exceptions to this “members-only” limitation in 
the context of civil jurisdiction; these were set out in Montana v. United States,46 the 
current lodestar regarding tribal civil jurisdiction.  First, a tribe may regulate “the 
 
41 Id. at 210. 
42 Id. at 210-11 (citing and quoting Ex parte Crow Dog, 109 U.S. 556, 571 (1883)). 
43 See id. at 212. 
44 See Wheeler v. United States, 435 U.S. 313, 326 (1978) (“The areas in which such implicit divestiture of 
sovereignty has been held to have occurred are those involving the relations between an Indian tribe and 
nonmembers of the tribe”) (holding Indian tribe has criminal jurisdiction over tribal member for crime 
committed on tribes’ reservation on basis that it was an exercise of tribe’s retained right to internal self-
government). 
45 See Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544, 565 (1981). 
46 Id. 
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activities of nonmembers who enter consensual relationships with the tribe or its 
members.”47 Second, as to land owned by a particular tribe or held by the United States 
in trust for the tribe, that tribe has authority to prohibit or regulate nonmembers’ 
activities.48 Finally, as to fee lands within a tribe’s reservation boundaries, the tribe may 
regulate the “conduct of non-Indians” only “when that conduct threatens or has some 
direct effect on the political integrity, the economic security, or the health and welfare of 
the tribe.”49 
As apparent by this attempt to set out the law regarding tribal authority over 
nonmembers, Oliphant’s doctrine of implicit divestiture has resulted in a judicially-
devised system for assessing assertions of tribal authority that is tangled and 
unpredictable.  As jurisprudence now stands, various factors influence whether a tribe can 
assert jurisdiction: what jurisdiction the tribe is asserting (i.e., criminal or civil); over 
whom the tribe asserts jurisdiction (a tribal member or a non-Indian); how reservation 
lands are held (by the tribe, by the United States in trust for the tribe; or in fee); the 
character of a nonmember’s relationship to the tribe (consensual or not); and finally, the 
effect of a nonmember’s activities upon the tribe (whether or not they threaten or directly 
affect the tribe’s political integrity, economic security, health, or welfare).  Each factor is 
merely a means to assess whether a tribe’s assertion of jurisdiction is “inconsistent with 
its status.”  Nor are the principles articulated in current case law exhaustive: the Court 
could consider other factors and reach a decision contrary to these principles, which then 
would serve as a springboard for further iterations of limits on tribal jurisdiction. 
 
47 Id. 
48 Id. at 557 (tribe had authority to prohibit or regulate hunting and fishing). 
49 Id. at 566. 
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Speculating about applying implicit divestiture to possible assertions of tribal 
authority illustrates the problems caused by the doctrine’s vagaries.  Significantly, under 
Oliphant, the Court alone determines whether a tribe’s authority to act was implicitly 
divested.  Thus, Oliphant casts doubt upon all exercises of tribal sovereignty, because any 
exercise which seems legitimate at its outset later may be invalidated under implicit 
divestiture.  Professor Philip Frickey rightly describes this development as “a model of 
ad-hoc common law-making” that “supplement[s] the plenary power of Congress with 
[the Court’s] own plenary common law authority.”50 After Oliphant and its progeny, 
tribes can not be certain any assertion of tribal jurisdiction will be upheld. 
B. Reigning in Implicit Divestiture:  Duro, Lara, and the Congressional Delegation 
Exception 
 As the Court developed the doctrine of implicit divestiture, it recognized one 
exception to its general rule that divested tribes of authority the Court held to be 
“inconsistent with their status.”51 This exception was most clearly expressed in Montana 
v. United States: “Exercise of tribal power . . . inconsistent with the dependent status of 
the tribes . . . cannot survive without express congressional delegation.”52 Express 
congressional delegation, then, potentially could allow a tribe to exercise authority the 
Court otherwise would have found was divested. 
 
50 Philip P. Frickey, (Native) American Exceptionalism in Federal Indian Law, 119 HARV. L. REV. 431, 459 
(2005).  Frickey postulates that this approach grew out of the Court’s attempts to normalize law in Indian 
Country with Anglo-American jurisprudence.  He argues that, rather than using implicit divestiture to 
standardize law in Indian country, we should “hav[e] the courage to admit our larger confusions about the 
place of federal Indian law in public law.” Id. at 437. 
51 Oliphant v. Suquasmish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978). 
52 Montana, 450 U.S. at 564 (emphasis added).  See also Oliphant, 435 U.S. at 208 (tribes implicitly 
divested of criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians “absent affirmative delegation of such power by 
Congress”). 
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For many years, this exception was purely theoretical: no congressional act 
intervened to curtail implicit divestiture’s continuing erosion of tribal authority.  In 1990, 
however, Congress amended a statute so as to conflict with the Court’s holding in a case 
decided earlier that same year.  Following a challenge involving the effect of the 
amended statute, the Court was forced to consider the effects of the congressional 
delegation exception upon its implicit divestiture doctrine. 
 In 1990, the Court decided Duro v. Reina, 53 in which a member of the Torres-
Martinez Band of Cahuilla Mission Indians was arrested for a crime committed on the 
Pima-Maricopa Tribe’s reservation and was prosecuted by the Tribe. The defendant 
contested the Tribe’s asserting criminal jurisdiction over him.54 The Court ruled for the 
defendant on the basis that Indian tribes had been implicitly divested of criminal 
jurisdiction over “nonmember Indians” – Indians not members of the specific tribe 
asserting jurisdiction over them – for crimes committed on their reservations.55 The 
Court found that Congress had not considered tribal authority over nonmembers, and 
concluded that tribes’ retaining this authority would be inconsistent with their dependent 
status.56 
The Duro decision created an enormous problem respecting nonmember Indians 
who committed crimes within Indian Country: after Duro, no government had complete 
jurisdiction over these nonmembers.57 To address the problems created by Duro,
53 495 U.S. 676, 679 (1990). 
54 Id. at 681-82. 
55 Id. at 688. 
56 See id. at 690 (“[Congressional] statutes reflect at most the tendency of past Indian policy to treat Indians 
as an undifferentiated class”), 684-85 (“We think the [implicit divestiture] rationale . . . compels the 
conclusion that Indian tribes lack jurisdiction over persons who are not tribe members.”).  
57 Discussing the reason for this “prosecutorial void” is not necessary for the purposes of this Article.  Prior 
to Duro, it was clear that federal courts’ jurisdiction over Indians was sharply curtailed to jurisdiction for a 
small list of enumerated crimes.  States usually did not have jurisdiction over Indians for crimes committed 
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Congress enacted the “Duro fix.”  This legislation amended relevant statutes to statutorily 
recognize Indian tribes’ “powers of self-government” to include “exercis[ing] criminal 
jurisdiction over all Indians.”58 Congress also amended existing statutes specifically to 
recognize the tribes’ power as an “inherent power of Indian tribes, hereby recognized and 
affirmed.”59 The amendments’ express allocation arguably put tribal jurisdiction over 
nonmember Indians within the implicit divestiture doctrine’s “express congressional 
delegation” exception.  Moreover, by casting the tribes’ criminal jurisdiction over 
nonmembers to be an exercise of inherent tribal power, Congress clarified that it 
considered tribal criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers to stem from retained tribal 
sovereignty rather than from Congress delegating federal power to the tribes. 
 In United States v. Lara, 60 the Court considered the effect of the “Duro fix” 
legislation upon tribal criminal jurisdiction.  Lara involved a nonmember Indian criminal 
defendant prosecuted for a crime committed on a tribe’s reservation under both tribal 
authority (under the Duro fix legislation) and federal authority.  Billy Jo Lara, an Indian, 
married a member of the Spirit Lake Tribe and lived on its reservation, but was not a 
member of the Tribe.61 After “several instances of serious misconduct,” the Spirit Lake 
Tribe excluded him from its reservation.62 Lara disobeyed the order, and, when federal 
 
on the reservation.  Duro held that tribes’ criminal jurisdiction was limited to tribal members.  Thus, after 
Duro, no authority had jurisdiction over many crimes committed by non-tribal-member Indians.  This is 
because both States and tribes lacked criminal jurisdiction altogether, and federal jurisdiction was limited to 
the enumerated crimes.  For a good discussion of criminal jurisdiction in Indian Country (written prior to 
the Court’s Duro decision), see Chriss Wetherington, Criminal Jurisdiction of Tribal Courts Over 
Nonmember Indians: The Circuit Split, 1989 DUKE L.J.1053 (1989) (arguing that tribal courts have 
jurisdiction over nonmembers). 
58 Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 101 P.L. 511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856 (1990) (temporary legislation)(emphasis 
added); Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 102 P.L. 137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (making change permanent). 
59Act of Nov. 5, 1990, 101 P.L. 511, § 8077(b), 104 Stat. 1856 (1990) (temporary legislation)(emphasis 
added); Act of Oct. 28, 1991, 102 P.L. 137, 105 Stat. 646 (1991) (making change permanent). 
60 541 U.S. 193 (2004). 
61 Id. at 196. 
62 Id. 
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officials stopped him, struck one of them.63 Based on Congress’ statutory amendments 
granting tribes criminal jurisdiction over all Indians (including nonmember Indians) for 
crimes committed on the reservation, the Tribe asserted jurisdiction over Lara and 
charged him with “violence to a policeman.”64 Lara pleaded guilty in Tribal Court and 
served 90 days in jail.65 Subsequently, the United States government prosecuted Lara for 
the federal crime of assaulting a federal officer.66 
Each side in Lara assumed the validity of the Tribe’s prosecution under the “Duro 
fix” legislation; the dispute was over its effect upon the United States’ efforts to 
prosecute under federal jurisdiction.  Lara claimed that tribal prosecutions under the 
“Duro fix” were made under federal authority that Congress had delegated to the tribes.67 
He moved to dismiss the federal prosecution, arguing that because it also was made under 
federal authority, it violated the Fifth Amendment’s Double Jeopardy clause.68 The 
United States argued that the Duro fix did not delegate federal power to tribes but instead 
enlarged tribes’ powers of self-government.69 Since the Tribe’s prosecution was made 
under its own sovereign authority, the two prosecutions were made by separate 
sovereigns, and subsequent federal prosecution did not violate the Double Jeopardy 
Clause.70 
The Court first decided that Congress had intended tribal sovereign power (and 
not federal power) to underlie tribal prosecutions.71 It reviewed the amendments’ plain 
 
63 Id. 
64 See id. 
65 Id. 
66 Id. at 197. 
67 United States v. Lara, 294 F.3d 1004, 1006 (2002). 
68 Lara, 541 U.S. at 197. 
69 Id. at 198. 
70 Id. 
71 Id. at 199. 
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language and legislative history, and found these showed that Congress had not intended 
merely to delegate federal authority to the tribes: rather, Congress had intended that tribal 
prosecutions under the statute be made under tribal sovereign authority.72 
Next, the Court determined that Congress’ plenary power over Indian tribes under 
the Constitution allowed it to expand the tribes’ sovereignty: 
[T]he Constitution grants Congress broad general powers to legislate in 
respect to Indian tribes, powers that we have consistently described as 
“plenary and exclusive.” . . . Congress, with this court’s approval, has 
interpreted the Constitution’s “plenary” grants of power as authorizing it 
to enact legislation that both restricts and, in turn, relaxes those restrictions 
on tribal sovereign authority.  From the Nation’s beginning Congress’ 
need for such legislative power would have seemed obvious.  After all, the 
Government’s Indian policies, applicable to numerous tribes with diverse 
cultures, affecting billions of acres of land, of necessity would fluctuate 
dramatically as the needs of the Nation and those of the tribes changed 
over time. . . . Such major policy changes inevitably involve major 
changes in the metes and bounds of tribal sovereignty.73 
The Court’s reasoning ratifies Congress’ authority to restore sovereignty to the tribes 
under the plenary power doctrine.  Just as Congress can use plenary power to restrict 
tribal sovereignty, it may use plenary power to expand it – as it meant to do by enacting 
the Duro fix.  Seen in this light, the “congressional delegation” exception is really a way 
of saying that Congress, by exercising its plenary power, can legislatively overrule the 
Court’s finding implicit divestiture. 
IV. POST-LARA: IS THE CONGRESSIONAL DELEGATION EXCEPTION “THE” 
ANSWER TO IMPLICIT DIVESTITURE? 
A. An Overview of Literature Treating the Congressional Delegation Exception:  Of 
Promise and Problems 
 
72 Id. (citing the statute’s language, committee reports, and statements made by various members of 
Congress while Congress considered the amendments). 
73 Id. at 200. 
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Though no new cases have reached the Court since Lara, commentators generally 
have accepted that Lara vindicates the congressional delegation exception as an avenue 
to enlarge tribal authority, and cite express congressional delegation as a means of 
resolving various problems that confront Indian Country.  For example, authors have 
suggested express congressional delegation could expand tribal authority to tax,74 could 
allow tribes criminal jurisdiction over non-Indians who committed crimes on the 
reservation,75 and could provide for inter-tribal enforcement of each tribe’s court orders;76 
one commentator reads Lara in conjunction with Maine’s Indian Claims Settlement Act 
and Congress’ Indian Claims Settlement Act to propose that Maine tribes could force 
state courts to recognize same-sex marriages acknowledged under tribal law.77 While 
articles usually treat the subject of tribal jurisdiction in the context of a specific issue, 
some authors posit that Congress could use Lara to annul the Court’s broadest incursions 
into tribal authority: its holdings in Oliphant and Montana.78 
74 See Anna-Marie Tabor, Sovereignty In the Balance: Taxation by Tribal Governments, 15 U. FLA. J.L. &
PUB. POLICY 349, 399 (2004) (citing Lara for proposition that “congressional action could . . . expand the 
reach of tribal [tax] jurisdiction”); see also Matthew L. M. Fletcher, In Pursuit of Tribal Economic 
Development as a Substitute for Reservation Tax Revenue, 80 N.D. L. REV. 759, 800-03 (2004) (Congress 
could extend tribal authority to tax non-Indians). 
75 See Amy Radon, Note, Tribal Jurisdiction and Domestic Violence: The Need for Non-Indian 
Accountability on the Reservation, 37 U. MICH. J.L. REFORM 1275, 1295, 1301-02 (2004) (Congress should 
affirm tribal jurisdiction over non-Indian men accused of committing domestic violence against Indian 
women). 
76 Steven J. Gunn, Compacts, Confederacies, and Comity: Intertribal Enforcement of Tribal Court Orders,
34 N.M. L. REV. 297, 322 (2004). 
77 L. Scott Gould, December Song: The Waiting Game for Tribal Sovereignty in Maine, 20 ME. B.J. 18, 21-
23 (2005).  Maine’s Indian Claims Settlement Act expressly stated that Maine could not regulate “internal 
tribal matters,” which the Act defined to include “membership” and marriage between tribal members who 
reside on the reservation; the federal Maine Indian Claims Settlement Act provided that the tribes and 
Maine would give full faith and credit to each’s respective judicial proceedings.  Id. at 22-23.  Gould 
suggests the tribes could use their powers to define marriage to allow same-sex marriages prohibited under 
Maine’s laws; Maine would have to honor these marriages under the federal Act’s full faith and credit 
provisions. Id. at 23.  He also posits that the tribes might have jurisdiction over non-Indian same-sex 
couples who wished to marry under tribal law. Id.
78 Gould, supra note 77, at 21; Gunn, supra note 76, at 322. 
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Notwithstanding the congressional delegation exception’s availability in theory, 
commentators have identified practical obstacles that may prevent using Lara to further 
expand tribal jurisdiction.  Of these, the most commonly cited is the political process 
itself.  Many commentators suggest that Congress lacks the “political will” to statutorily 
enlarge jurisdiction, except under limited circumstances like those that led to the “Duro 
fix.”79 One author opines that Congress actually would be hostile to the idea: “there 
remains a core of ill will toward Indian nations and sovereignty in both congressional 
houses.”80 Another practical problem is that tribes, who have suffered under the plenary 
power doctrine, may not be willing to use it to their advantage.81 
B. The Lurking Issue: Implicit Divestiture as an Unmoored Doctrine 
 As summarized above, most of the commentary regarding Lara focuses on 
discussing the Duro fix as an application of the congressional delegation exception, and 
postulating further applications this exception may have in Indian Country.  
Commentators see congressional delegation as a means by which Congress can reverse 
the Court’s implicit divestiture holdings, and as a way it can enlarge the tribes’ authority 
while proactively preventing legal challenges.  Under this reading, the major obstacle to 
using the congressional delegation exception to vindicate tribal sovereignty is the 
practical problem of convincing Congress and the tribes to do so. 
 However promising Lara’s acceptance of the congressional delegation exception 
is, the most important aspect of the Lara decision is what it reveals about implicit 
 
79 See Gould, supra note 77, at 21; Gunn, supra note 76, at 322-323; Tabor, supra note 74, at 401; Fletcher, 
supra note 74, at 802. 
80 See Christopher J. Schneider, Hornell Brewing Co. v. Rosebud Sioux Tribal Court: Denigrating the Spirit 
of Crazyhorse to Restrain the Scope of Tribal Court Jurisdiction, 43 S.D. L. REV. 486, 525 (1998) (written 
prior to Lara). 
81 Gunn, supra note 76, at 324. 
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divestiture: currently, the doctrine lacks a consistent rationale.  In fact, the rationale the 
Lara Court offers for implicit divesture differs significantly from that it set out in 
Oliphant. The Lara Court does not acknowledge this discrepancy, but it could prove 
problematic.  Theoretical inconsistency may indicate that implicit divestiture doctrine is a 
moving target.  Lara may not, after all, provide the definitive statement of implicit 
divestiture’s scope and consequences.  If it does not, Lara’s usefulness for Indian Country 
may be more limited than current literature suggests.  
The Lara opinion appears to set out a rationale for implicit divestiture:  
[The Duro fix] relaxes the restrictions, recognized in Duro, that the 
political branches had imposed on the tribes’ exercise of inherent 
prosecutorial power. . . . [Holdings finding implicit divestiture] reflect the 
Court’s view of the tribes’ retained sovereign status as of the time the 
Court made them.82 
Here, the Court implies that divestiture was accomplished by legislative and executive 
acts.  The Court’s divestiture rulings seem to result from the Court’s reasoning that 
Congress had impliedly exercised its plenary power to divest tribal sovereignty.  In cases 
where it thought Congress had enacted a law without explicitly addressing all issues 
relating to Indian Country, the Court was inferring congressional intent, and using 
implicit divestiture to effectuate that intent.  Under this rationale, implicit divestiture 
would divest any attributes of tribal sovereignty which interfered with Congress’ intent in 
passing any particular legislation.83 
In Oliphant, however, the Court offered a different rationale.  After announcing 
implicit divestiture’s rule that “Indian tribes are prohibited from exercising both those 
 
82 United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 200, 205 (2004) (emphasis in original). 
83 Under Lara’s rationale, implicit divestiture essentially would serve as a gap-filler by effectuating 
Congress’ intent when the congressional act failed to speak to the matter at issue. 
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[sovereign] powers . . . that are expressly terminated by Congress and those powers 
‘inconsistent with their status[,]’”84 the Court went on to explain: 
We have already described some of the inherent limitations on tribal 
powers that stem from [tribes’] incorporation into the United States. In 
Johnson v. M’Intosh, . . . we noted that the Indian tribes’ “power to 
dispose of the soil at their own will, to whomsoever they pleased,” was 
inherently lost to the overriding sovereignty of the United States. And in 
Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, . . . the Chief Justice observed that since 
Indian tribes are “completely under the sovereignty and dominion of the 
United States, . . . any attempt [by foreign nations] to acquire their lands, 
or to form a political connexion with them, would be considered by all as 
an invasion of our territory, and an act of hostility.” . . . Nor are the 
intrinsic limitations on Indian tribal authority restricted to limitations on 
the tribes’ power to transfer lands or exercise external political 
sovereignty.85 
Here, the Court says that the tribes’ “incorporation into the United States” limited their 
powers.  The Court also holds that limitations on tribal sovereignty “stem” from this 
incorporation.  Finally, the Court adds that the limitations on tribal sovereignty that it has 
mentioned – presumably, those that “stem” from “incorporation” – are not exclusive.   
Since Oliphant situates “incorporation” at the heart of implicit divestiture doctrine, 
it becomes vital to understand it.  The Court’s examples indicate that it is using 
“incorporation” to describe rights conferred upon a discoverer under the doctrine of 
discovery.  As discussed in Section II, Johnson originally stood for the propositions that 
discovery divested tribes of the ability to convey their land freely, and also of the 
authority to have government-to-government relations with anyone but their discoverer.86 
In Oliphant, the Court lists the results of discovery Johnson recognized, and cites them as 
examples of limitations that result from the tribes’ incorporation.  What, in prior cases, 
 
84 Oliphant v. Suquamish Indian Tribe, 435 U.S. 191, 208 (1978) (emphasis in original). 
85 Id. at 209 (deciding that Indian tribes’ “dependent status” implicitly divested them of criminal 
jurisdiction over non-Indians).  
86 Supra pp. 4-5. 
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the Court held to result from discovery, it now describes as resulting from 
“incorporation.”  Moreover, the Court identifies “incorporation” as the event that limits 
tribal authority.  Given that the consequences of incorporation are those of discovery, it 
seems the Court is saying that discovery is the event which divested the tribes of 
authority “inconsistent with their status.” 
If discovery is the event which compels implicit divestiture, Oliphant appears to 
broaden Johnson’s doctrine of discovery.  Under Oliphant, the effects of 
incorporation/discovery may not be limited to Johnson’s prior holdings.  By saying that 
intrinsic limitations on tribal authority are not “restricted to limitations on the tribes’ 
power to transfer lands or exercise political sovereignty[,]” the Oliphant Court seems to 
imply that discovery carries additional, unenumerated consequences.  Thus, in Oliphant,
if discovery is the source of divestiture, its consequence is that tribes are divested of any
sovereign power the Court determines to be inconsistent with their status.87 
Comparing the Lara and Oliphant implicit divestiture rationales side by side 
highlights the points at which the two paradigms diverge.  These theoretical differences 
reflect models of implicit divestiture that are significantly different and potentially 
incompatible.  Because the rationale the Court ultimately chooses will have dramatic 
repercussions upon the scope of authority it allows tribes to exercise, it is important to 
examine the differences between the two rationales and the consequences of each.  
 The first point of difference between the two rationales is what each identifies as 
the source of limits on tribal sovereignty.  Lara identifies Congress as the source of these 
 
87 For example, if discovery divested tribes of the right to alienate land (Johnson), discovery would also 
divest tribes of the rights to criminally prosecute non-Indians (Oliphant), to criminally prosecute 
nonmembers (Duro), and so on.  Every power of which the tribes were held to be divested would relate 
back to the date of their discovery. 
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limits: Congress’ plenary power over tribes allows it unilaterally to restrict tribal 
authority.  Under this model, Congress divests tribes of specific sovereign powers 
piecemeal, by various congressional acts that either deal directly with or that indirectly 
affect Indian Country.  By contrast, Oliphant’s reasoning implies that discovery is the 
sole source of limits upon tribal sovereignty.  Under Oliphant, divestiture occurred in one 
fell swoop at the point of the tribes’ discovery, and independently of any congressional 
exercise of plenary power. 
In addition, the two decisions cast the Court’s role differently.  In Lara, implicit 
divestiture is the means by which the Court attempts to consummate congressional intent.  
Congress’ acts impose limits on tribes’ authority; the Court discerns and enforces these 
limits, using the doctrine of implicit divestiture to invalidate exercises of tribal authority 
that exceed them.  Thus, under Lara, congressional intent circumscribes the Court’s role.  
Since implicit divestiture is merely a means of effectuating congressional intent, any 
ruling refuted by Congress would override the decision by showing that the Court had 
failed to correctly discern and implement Congress’ intent.   
In Oliphant, however, divestiture automatically resulted from the tribes’ 
discovery, and implicit divestiture doctrine is the Court’s way of enforcing the limits it 
considers to result from discovery.  Because the Court alone determines what limits 
discovery imposes upon tribal sovereignty, this model gives the Court unlimited latitude 
itself to determine the bounds of tribal authority. 
The Lara Court’s opinion does not acknowledge that its rationale for implicit 
divestiture differs from Oliphant’s.  The fact that Lara’s majority disregarded this 
disparity should give pause to those who see Lara as a way of overruling implicit 
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divestiture. 88 The asymmetries are troubling because they cause different results 
regarding the Court’s authority to invalidate tribal actions via implicit divestiture doctrine 
and also Congress’ role in setting the bounds of tribal authority.  A skeptic might say that 
having two concurrent implicit divestiture rationales gives the Court latitude to cite to 
whichever one allows it to reach its desired result.  At the very least, it leaves open the 
possibility that the Court might find that discovery divested the tribes of the sovereignty 
necessary for some assertions of jurisdiction. 89 
C. Constitutional Limits on the Congressional Delegation Exception?: an Illustration 
of the Problems of an Unmoored Doctrine 
 A few commentators have discussed a conundrum contained in the Lara decision 
that may illustrate the problems caused by vagaries in implicit divestiture’s rationale. The 
Court’s comments in Lara and other cases indicate that it may consider tribal authority 
somehow to be circumscribed by the United States Constitution.90 Steven J. Gunn draws 
upon various Court opinions to offer a succinct overview of the Court’s concerns: 
 The Lara Court mentioned, but did not “consider,” the question of 
“whether the Constitution’s Due Process or Equal Protection Clauses 
prohibit tribes from prosecuting a nonmember citizen of the United 
States.”  Thus, while the Court held that Congress possesses the 
“constitutional power to enact a statute that modifies tribal power,” it did 
not decide whether the Duro fix itself ran afoul of the Constitution by 
 
88 But cf. Alex Tallchief Skibine, Redefining the Status of Indian Tribes Within “Our Federalism”: Beyond 
the Dependency Paradigm, 38 CONN. L. REV. 667, 679 (2006).  Skibine argues that Lara narrows the scope 
of implicit divestiture doctrine, and premises this argument upon his belief that Lara’s majority opinion 
repeals parts of Oliphant’s implicit divestiture rationale. Id. Skibine later posits, however, that the 
congressional delegation exception nonetheless may be limited.  He suggests that the Court’s recent 
decisions “could be construed” as defining Congress’ plenary power over “Indian affairs” narrowly, to 
exclude any matter that implicates state interests. Id. at 683 (“While the Court repeatedly insists that 
Congress has plenary authority over Indian affairs, recent cases could be construed as indicating that the 
Court might consider regulation of non-Indians on Indian reservations as not always involving such ‘Indian 
affairs’ over which Congress has plenary power.”).  If so, the congressional delegation exception would be 
available only in matters that involved Indian interests exclusively. 
 
90 Gunn, supra note 76, at 318-19; cf. Radon, supra note 75, at 1306-09 (“dominant society” is concerned 
that tribal courts will not protect individual’s rights and liberties). 
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permitting tribes to prosecute nonmember Indian citizens without 
affording them “certain constitutional safeguards.”  . . . 
 [T]he Court has stated that it would be “inconsistent with the 
overriding interests of the National Government” to permit Indian tribes to 
prosecute non-tribal members in “tribal courts which do not accord the full 
protections of the Bill of Rights.”  The Court has long held that the Bill of 
Rights does not apply to Indian tribal governments, and while the Indian 
Civil Rights Act . . . imposes on tribal governments “some guarantees of 
fair procedure,” it does not incorporate all of the protections under the Bill 
of Rights.  For example, . . . ICRA contains no guarantee of court 
appointed counsel for indigent criminal defendants.  In light of this and 
other limitations, the Court has suggested that there may be “constitutional 
limitations” on the ability of Congress, “through recognition of inherent 
tribal authority” or otherwise, to “subject American citizens to criminal 
proceedings before a tribunal that does not provide constitutional 
protections as a matter of right.” 
. . . .
As for the Equal Protection Clause, the Court has suggested that 
congressional authorization of tribal power over nonmember Indians, but 
not over non-Indians, may raise equal protection concerns.91 
As Gunn’s synopsis makes clear, the Court consistently has hinted that tribal criminal 
jurisdiction over nonmembers may be subject to constitutional limits.  Specifically, the 
Court speculates that, depending on how Congress structured its delegation, tribal 
jurisdiction could run afoul of the Due Process and Equal Protection clauses.   
 Though Gunn’s analysis focuses on possible constitutional limits regarding tribal 
criminal jurisdiction over nonmembers, it seems likely the Court also might find the 
Constitution imposes limits on other kinds of jurisdiction – including civil adjudicative 
jurisdiction and legislative jurisdiction.  Constitutional concerns would seem to apply 
equally to these areas: any exercise of tribal jurisdiction potentially could subject 
American citizens to action that would be unconstitutional if taken by the federal, state, 
or municipal governments.   
 
91 Gunn, supra note 76, at 318-19 (citations omitted).  In addition to Lara, Gunn quotes and cites Wash. v. 
Confederated Tribes of Colville Indian Reservation, 447 U.S. 134 (1980), and Duro v. Reina, 495 U.S. 
676 (1990). 
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The Court’s comments nonetheless are difficult to explain doctrinally, because the 
Court’s jurisprudence expressly holds that Indian tribes are not subject to the 
Constitution.92 One commentator has criticized the Court’s dicta on this basis.  Philip P. 
Frickey addresses the problems inherent in the Court’s constitutional arguments through 
his critique of Justice Kennedy’s Lara dissent, which was based upon constitutional 
concerns:  
For Justice Kennedy, the Constitution “is based on a theory of original, 
and continuing, consent of the governed.”  The people condition this 
consent, he reasoned, upon a federal structure that limits the powers of 
both the national and state governments.  Justice Kennedy suggested that 
Congress’ authorization of tribal prosecutions violates the constitutional 
structure, for it allows an American citizen to be tried within the United 
States by a government to which that person has not granted the consent of 
the governed. . . . 
. . . .
“The original, and continuing, consent of the governed” is a 
strange idea [to apply to tribal governments].  Just when and how did all 
the Indian tribes become part of the constitutional system?  The answer 
from constitutional text is never  . . . Justice Kennedy’s argument reduces 
to this remarkable contention: tribes may be judicially subjugated based on 
the mystical implications of a document by which they have never 
consented to be bound and to which they have never even been coercively 
tied  . . . because the document is manifestly good.  The argument is 
driven by an almost irresistible impulse of coherence flowing from the 
canonical place of the Constitution in our legal culture and the related 
instinct that all exercises of governmental power must somehow be subject 
to it.93 
As seen in Gunn’s synopsis, the Court consistently has indicated that tribal governments 
might be subject to constitutional limits.  Although the Court has not recently confronted 
a direct challenge to tribal action based on constitutional concerns, Frickey correctly 
notes the problem with a constitutional argument: doctrinally, tribes are not subject to the 
 
92 Talton v. Mayes, 163 U.S. 376 (1896).  
93 Frickey, supra note 50, at 465, 468. 
29
Constitution.  In order to contend otherwise, the Court seemingly would have to identify 
a point at which tribal action became subject to the Constitution. 
 Frickey suggests that the Court cannot identify this point because it does not exist.  
Instead, says Frickey, Justice Kennedy resorts to a legal fiction: the “consent of the 
governed” argument.  Under this argument, the citizenry’s consent to be governed by the 
United States is based upon its understanding that the government action to which it is 
subject is limited by the Constitution.  Therefore, any federal action subjecting a citizen 
to a tribal government would be invalid, because it subjects the citizenry to a government 
not limited by the Constitution. 94 The federal action granting the tribe jurisdiction would 
exceed the reign the citizenry allowed the federal government. 
 Frickey argues that the “consent of the governed” argument is a “seduction” 
which “requires resisting.”95 Certainly it bodes ill for tribes.  Assuming the argument is 
merely a “seduction,”96 however, the rationale for applying constitutional principles to 
the tribes would be a legal fiction, susceptible to attack as sleight of hand. However, 
Kennedy’s “consent of the governed” rationale may not be the only rationale supporting 
the argument that the Constitution limits exercises of tribal authority.  The Court’s 
implicit divestiture jurisprudence may provide another, intractable rationale: the doctrine 
of discovery. 
 
94 This statement assumes that the federal grant of jurisdiction was not conditioned upon the tribe’s being 
bound by constitutional mandates.  Presumably, if a grant of jurisdiction to the tribe met constitutional 
muster, the grant would be within the scope of the citizenry’s consent to the federal government and would 
therefore be valid. 
95 Id. at 468. 
96 This assertion is arguable.  The “consent of the governed” rationale may have a basis in the Tenth 
Amendment, which reserves powers not delegated to the United States “to the States respectively, or to the 
people.” U.S. Const. amend X.  One could argue that the people had not delegated the United States the 
power to subject them to governments that did not comport with the Constitution; under the Tenth 
Amendment, then, the United States would lack the power to compel U.S. citizens to be subject to tribal 
jurisdiction. 
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Specifically, the Court could cite Oliphant’s implicit divestiture rationale to find 
that discovery divested the tribes of the ability to exercise sovereignty in a way 
inconsistent with the Constitution.  This reasoning would establish the Constitution as a 
constraint on tribal assertions of jurisdiction and would explain the Court’s cryptic 
warnings that tribes were subject to constitutional limitations.   
If the Court follows this course, its decisions ultimately will clarify that 
Oliphant’s implicit divestiture rationale remains viable post-Lara, and that discovery still 
can function as a source of power, independent of and concurrent with that described in 
Lara, by which the Court can divest tribes of authority.  If Oliphant’s rationale still is 
good, the Court retains authority to define what types of tribal authority are 
“inconsistent” with the tribes’ status, and also unilaterally to strip tribes of power under 
the implicit divestiture doctrine.  Moreover, if the Court holds that discovery can 
accomplish divestiture absent congressional action, the congressional delegation 
exception might not be an available means for Congress to override a Court decision that 
relies upon it.  If Oliphant and Lara represent concurrent sources of authority for implicit 
divestiture, the Court has latitude to limit the congressional delegation exception’s 
availability to Lara’s congressionally-driven, plenary power rationale. 
 The confusion surrounding implicit divestiture’s rationale – or rationales – makes 
the doctrine unmoored and malleable.  Ultimately, it may call Lara’s utility into question, 
because the implicit divestiture rationale the Court adopts may delineate the bounds of 
authority that Congress can restore to the tribes.  Unless the Court clarifies that the 
doctrine of discovery does not underpin implicit divestiture, the Court nonetheless may 
invalidate exercises of tribal sovereignty expressly sanctioned by Congress.  This result 
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would remove much of the power of the congressional delegation exception by situating 
the Court as the final arbiter of tribal sovereignty. 
V. CONCLUSION 
 From the beginning of its jurisprudence, the Supreme Court’s holdings have 
ratified the federal government’s encroachment upon Indian lands and sovereignty.  The 
doctrines of discovery and plenary power provide dramatic examples of the way the 
Court has developed doctrines that vindicate United States interests at the tribes’ expense. 
 Implicit divestiture undoubtedly is another such doctrine, but its characteristics 
distinguish it from its predecessors.  Unlike the doctrine of plenary power, implicit 
divestiture is judicially-driven.  Moreover, unlike either discovery or plenary power, 
implicit divestiture’s reach as yet is undefined.  Under the doctrine, the Court potentially 
wields significant power to invalidate exercises of tribal authority. 
 At first blush, Lara appears to provide a welcome means to legislatively overrule 
the Court’s implicit divestiture holdings, and even act preemptively on the tribes’ behalf, 
using the legislative process to ensure that tribes can effectively govern and manage 
Indian Country.  On closer inspection, however, the congressional delegation exception 
may be less promising than it appears.  The Court continues to speculate that 
congressional delegation might be subject to external limits, and, in Lara, practically 
invites parties to challenge the Duro fix on constitutional grounds.97 Meanwhile, its 
Oliphant rationale – the doctrine of discovery in disguise – continues to lurk in the 
background. 
 
97 See United States v. Lara, 541 U.S. 193, 209 (2004) (“Other defendants in tribal proceedings remain free 
to raise [a constitutional claim] should they wish to do so.  See 25 U.S.C. §1303 (vesting district courts with 
jurisdiction over habeas writs from tribal courts).”). 
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Given these factors, the congressional delegation exception likely is not the 
panacea for implicit divestiture.  Indeed, although constitutional concerns may provide a 
starting point for the Court to re-examine the validity of exercises of tribal sovereignty, 
they are not necessarily its terminus.  The Court might go further, and find that discovery 
implicitly divested the tribes of the ability to exercise sovereignty consistently with the 
Constitution.  Ironically, Lara – a decision hailed by many as a triumph for tribal 
sovereignty98 – may serve as the starting point for limits upon sovereignty that are more 
stringent, not less. 
 
98 E.g., Bethany R. Berger, United States v. Lara as a Story of Native Agency, 40 TULSA L. REV. 5 (2004). 
